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I am going to argue for a thesis that almost nobody in 
this audience would dispute: animals have things they 
care about, and the fact that animals care about them 
has moral significance. However, the lack of 
disagreement (in this forum, at least) should not disguise 
the fact that more work needs to be done, both to answer 
a recent spate ofattempts to deny the thesis and to clarify 
exactly what "caring about" means, covers, and entails 
for our moral theories. 
It might be more natural to talk about animals' 
interests, rather than what they care about. Unfor-
tunately, this term has been interpreted in so many 
different ways that its use invites confusion. On one 
end of the spectrum, Tom Regan wants to allow for 
both preference and welfare interests, where the latter 
can involve things about which the subject knows or 
understands nothing. 1 On the other end, R.G. Frey 
associates "interests" with terms such as "wants" and 
"desires," and further argues that these states require 
a language.2 Rather than try to dictate which of these 
interpretations more nearly renects ordinary English 
usage (a misguided project at bes!), I have chosen to 
use a lenn which I hope (a) has less "baggage," at 
least in the debate about animals, (b) will allow me to 
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specify what "caring about" means, and why it is 
important, and (c) in both ordinary usage and the 
broader philosophical tradition captures a distinction 
that is worth preserving. 
R.G. Frey is perhaps the most familiar defender of 
the position that animals cannot have desires. Although 
he does not use terms like "care about," his conclusion 
also entails that animals are incapable of caring about 
things in the sense to be defmed below. His argument 
can be summarized as follows: 
P-I. In order for S to desire 0, S must have some 
beliefs about O. 
1'-2. Beliefs require the ability to entertain and 
accept certain statements as true, and hence the 
ability to draw a distinction between true and 
false statements. 
P-3.1be ability to draw a distinction between true 
and false statements requires the use of 
language, and some understanding of how 
language represents states of affairs. 
P-4. Animals lack the requisite linguistic abilities. 
C. Therefore, animals lack beliefs, desires, and 
interests.3 
Although this argument is most closely associated 
with Frey, it has been echoed by Michael Leahy.4 Both 
agree, for example, that Regan's broader use of 
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"interest" cannot be sufficient to establish moral 
relevance, since Regan's concept of interests would, 
according to them, entails that tractors as well as can 
have "interests" in that sense. 
Many animal scientists also reject talk of animals' 
interests or desires or caring, usually preferring terms 
such as "needs" which seem to them more quantifiable 
and testable, hence more scientifically respectable. A 
full defensc ofmy appeal to a concept of "caring about" 
should address the scientific claim; also Carruthers's 
arguments on this subject, and would explore some 
reasons why Daniel Dennett's reeent account of 
consciousness5 poses a very similar threat to talk of 
animals' interests and caring. Although there will not 
be time to do justice to these themes today, they do 
indicate the range of serious challenges to the idea that 
animals do have interests and care about things. 
As I have already acknowledged, terms like 
"interests" have a rather messy history, even within 
the narrow confines of debates about animals. Very 
roughly, wilh many intermediate possibilities lefl 
aside, the two opposing interpretations of "s has an 
interest in 0''6 would be: 
(I) "s [rationally?] desires 0," or 
(2) "0 would enhance S's ability to fulfill its proper 
function, role, or telos." 
Sense (I) is the one that leads Frey, Carruthers, 
and Leahy to reject the claim that animals can have 
full-blown morally weighty interests. Again acknowl-
edging the oversimplification, it would seem that for 
all three, S's desiring 0 entails (a) that there is a way 
of specifying, fixing, or correctly identifying the 
object of 5's desire, and (b) that 5 has the capacity 
to identify 0 and distinguish it from things that would 
not satisfy the desire. 
The perhaps surprising link with Dennett comes 
primarily through condition (a), with (b) providing a 
secondary connection. Although Dennett is generally 
considered a supporter of cognitive ethology and its 
references to the intentional mental states of animals,7 
his more recent championing of "heteropheIlOIIlOllology" 
gives a special role to language in fixing the appropriate 
ascription of intentional states.8 
A tempting, but probably misguided, response to 
this argument is to treat it a<; a variant on the problem 
of other minds: we can never get to the truth of what 
the cat wants, because the cat can't tell us in 
unambiguous enough terms.9 If we interpret the issue 
this way, we might be tempted to respond: "we can't 
tell, but the cat can, and that's what matters." This would 
beg the question: the charge is not simply that we cannot 
properly identify the object of the cat's desire, but that 
it cannot have any desires without a language in which 
to express true and false propositions about that object. 
l1le charge is that the cat lacks a medium in which to 
refer to or represent the object of any belief or desire, 
and hence cannot have beliefs and desires. 
Contemporary philosophy provides a much more 
effective response to this concern about the possibility 
ofhaving an object ofbeliefor desire. 10 l1le two salient 
points for our purpose, in their most general form, are: 
(1) any adequate psychological theory that hopes to 
explain animal behavior will have to attribute to many 
animals the ability to receive, encode, recall, and use 
such information;ll and (2) there is no reason to think 
that the medium in which the mind/brain encooes and 
manipulates information is identical with the language 
(if any) in which one communicates. Hence, the lack 
of a natural language of communication does not 
provide gocxl evidence against the hypothesis that a 
bcing has a language of thought. And it is the 
language of thought or something analogous to it, 
not communication, that provides the basis for 
propositional attitudes. 
Ibe first of these very general ideas drawn from 
contemporary philosophy of mind is an essential part 
of a more general demonstration of why Behaviorism 
simply won't work. Behaviorism simply has not been 
able to give an adequate theory which explains the 
behavior of (at least) birds and mammals simply in terms 
of stimulus response and positive and negative 
reinforcements; either because the salient features for 
explaining the feature may not be present in the 
environment at the time, or because the feature is not 
one which can be captured in law-like statements about 
the environment.12 In marked contmst to the failures of 
Behaviorism, theories that work inevitably postulate that 
complex creatures can carry with them and access 
illlemally stored information about the world. 
l1lere are important disputes about the medium and 
mechanisms required to store and use information: 
does it have syntactic structure? how holistic is it? etc. 
(Even, in Dennett's ca<;e: in what sense is it real?).l1le 
relevant point of agreement for our purposes is that the 
medium cannot be limited to natural languages such 
as English. To do so (a) threatens to lead to an infinite 
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regress of interpretations of linguistic signs, (b) 
overlooks thc fact that a very large portion of cognitive 
psychology works as well for animals that lack a naturnl 
language (small humans as well as nonhumans) as it 
does for adult language users, and (c) founders on the 
question of how we can learn a language without the 
prior ability to form hypotheses. Moreover, the inner 
representations in this medium, whatever it is, can be 
accurate or inaccurate, true or false, thus answering 
another of Frey's concerns. 
If the foregoing argument is correct, we have 
explained how a being can have beliefs and desires 
without having a language with which to communicate 
descriptions about the objects of those inner states. Thus, 
many animals can have beliefs and desires, and satisfy 
the conditions set forth for having interests in a morally 
relevant sense. 13 Moreover, tractors don't have these 
sorts of inner states, and neither do paramecia. 14 
However, we are not out of the woods yet: although 
tractors and paramecia don't have desires (because they 
don't have mental representations), computers might 
well, and it would certainly disturb our rellective 
equilibrium to find our moral theory generating direct 
duties to our PC's. 
This is where "caring about" becomes relevant. At 
least none of the current crop ofartificial life cares about 
whcther it gets what it wants. IS I wish to claim that we 
can identify a sense of "caring about" such that many 
animals typically do care about getting what they desire, 
but (at least the current generation of) computers do 
not. In order to justify that claim, we will have to unpack 
the notion of caring. 
I propose to do this via an indirect approach: by 
asking if/how we might be justified in saying that one 
animal is happier or more contented than another. If 
animal scientists read this paper, they will certainly 
either cringe or fume at the sloppy, untestable 
language, but that is exactly why I chose these terms. 
Despite their lack of direct physiological or behavioral 
correlates or indicators (or "operant definitions"), 
terms like "happy" and "content" do have a justifiable 
place in the scientific study of animals, and they also 
provide a clearer foundation for investigating what 
animals care about. 
TIle rust thing any self-respecting animal scientist 
would do at tllis point is to ask what I mean by "happy," 
trying to raise the suspicion that there is no real state to 
be relied on here. The [ust thing any self-respecting 
philosopher would respond is that the demand for 
necessary and sufficient conditions was well buried with 
logical positivism; although we sometimes can and 
ought to offcr such conditions, they arc not always 
necessary for knowledge or respectable science. The 
undeniable fact is that experienced observers can tell 
quite well when an animal is happy. 
On the one hand, books about dog training, 
horseback riding, animal husbandry of all sorts, are 
filled with statements like: any good dog owner 
(dairyman, rider, etc.) can tell whether an animal is 
happy, fearful, bored, or irritated. On the other hand, at 
some point in almost any discussion of the treatment 
of farm or laboratory animal, someone inevitably raises 
the challenge: "But you can't really give us hard 
seientific data about how to tell whether an animal is 
happy, can youT' This challenge may be followed witb 
the assertion liat it is lierefore wrong to demand tbat 
we act as if a severely confined animal is unhappy 
(since we don't know for sure liat he is), or even the 
charge that one is committing the eighth deadly sin: 
antluopomorphism. 
The answer to this challenge lies in some fairly 
straightforward epistemology. On the assumption tbat 
we can set aside extreme skepticism (which would mean 
we would have to doubt not only the mental life but lie 
physical existence of the sow and her crate, as well as 
the mental lives of fellow humans), there are two widely 
recognized reliable indications that we know what we 
arc talking about, and that we are describing something 
real about the world. 
The first way to convince you that I know what I'm 
talking about, that I'm saying something true, is to 
describe to you a general scientific theory and 
methodology that allows us to explain, predict, and 
understand in a fairly deep way, what is going on. If 
you ask me why stones roll downhill, and I glibly assure 
you that "it's because of gravity," you probably should 
probe to see whether I can back up my assertion in this 
sort of way. You might find out that I know no more 
about gravity than a nineteentb century biologist who 
blithely tells us liat we move because of our elan vital. 
This, of course, is tbe ultimate aim of science. We want 
to know not only what happens, but why it happens. As 
a result of a better understanding of why tbings happen, 
I often also get better at predicting and identifying what 
happens: as a result of understanding. In the case of 
happiness, this approach does not look very promising. 
However, we often do remarkably well even in the 
absence of such deep explanatory theories, and we do 
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so without lapsing into "subjectivity." All ofus, to some 
extent, and some of us to an astounding extent, can 
recognize features of the world without being able to 
spell out in any detailed way how we do so. lIere are 
some examples: I 6 
(I) Chicken sexers. 
(2) SAT evaluators and others who grade "stand-
ardized" essay exams. 
(3) Chess players who recognize significant patterns. 
(4) Any competent English speaker judging the 
grammaticality of sentences. 
The objectivity in such cases is established in two 
ways. First, predictive success: the success rate of the 
chicken sexer can be determined quite easily, and good 
pattern recognizers will win more chess games. Second, 
where the observers are in fact picking out something 
that is really there, we find a high degree of inter-
subjective agreement, at least among skilled, trained, 
experienced practitioners. These two features provide 
good epistemic warrant for believing that observers are 
accurately detecting an objective feature of the world, 
something that is really "out there." Both features can 
often be found in judgments about an animal's 
emotional and mental states. 
Predictive success in judging an animal's inner 
states, including happiness, comes down to whether we 
can interact as we want to with animals: they do what 
we want, don't attack us, settle down calmly, thrive 
without developing "vices," and so on. That's why 
books on dog training and horseback riding are so filled 
with talk about the need to recognize when an animals 
is happy or contented. Learning to recognize these states 
increases one's success at working well with the animal. 
Intersubjective agreement (assuming objective, 
knowledgeable observers) is less obvious in the case 
of animal happiness because heavily influenced by 
preconceptions and the fact Ihat we have been taught 
to talk about animals in more "rigorous" and "scientific" 
ways. However, if we focus on people who work and 
live with animals, the intersubjective agreement soon 
becomes apparent. Good dog handlers will usually agree 
about whether a dog is enjoying herself; two shepherds 
will pick out the same ewe as the one who is 
uncomfortable; and so on. 
Given that reports by observers with a high degree 
ofpredictive success and intersubjective agreement are 
perfectly respectable sources of objective knowledge 
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claims, and given that we have such a situation with 
reports about whether animals are happy, content, upset, 
etc., I conclude that we are justified in accepting those 
reports as descriptions ofanimals' actual states. Having 
done so, we are ready to return to the topic ofcaring about. 
Having argued that we can talk about an animal's 
being happy or unhappy, and make reliable judgments 
about such states, I now propose to define what Scares 
about in terms of what makes S happy (or less unhappy) 
in Ihe following manner: 
Scares about0 itS directly desires 0,17 and getting 
or achieving 0 contributes to S's happiness. 
This definition entails that getting (or being denied) 
what she cares about makes a difference to the general 
state of S's experienced well-being. It also allows for 
varying intensity of caring: some things will matter 
more than others. Finally, this definition entails that we 
can be mistaken about what we care about: we can think 
we care about something, only to discover that we were 
wrong: when we achieve it, we discover that it does 
not make us happy. These features combine to delineate 
a real phenomenon in many humans and many animals. 
The resulting definition accord~ well with our ordinary 
concept of caring about, and helps explain why the 
objects of caring carry moral significance in a way that 
more neutral interests may not. 
Let me emphasize that I am not claiming that we 
care about things because they contribute to our 
happiness; we may sometimes do so, but we may have 
all sorts of other reasons for caring about something. 
Rather, I am suggesting that a hallmark, a definitive 
criterion of what we care about (as opposed to what we 
think we care about) is that it contributes to our 
happiness or alleviates our unhappiness. 
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to 
otTer a complete axiology and to locate "what we care 
about" in that framework. However, at the very least, 
the sort of interests highlighted in this new vocabulary 
of "caring about" carry more prima facie moral weight 
than things that are merely "good for" some being. If 
one is a preference utilitarian, for example, caring about 
is a more obvious manifestation of preference than 
interests in any weaker sense. From a deontological 
perspective. paying due attention to what a being cares 
about seems an appropriate way of respecting the 
individual as a source of valuing, wilhout reducing him/ 
her to a mere contributor to the general good. In any 
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event the values highlighted by what we carc about will 
be hard to ignore in an adequate moral theory. 
In this paper, I have argued for two theses. 11le fIrst 
is that arguments such as Frey's and Leahy's fail to 
establish that animals do not have interests in a morally 
relevant sense. 11le second is that we can identify the 
relevant sense of interests, and at least begin to illustrate 
its moral relevance, by focusing on the question of what 
animals care about. There is much more to be said on 
this topic, of course. The critical side of my argument 
must be extended to respond more specillcally to other 
skeptics, such as Davidson and Carruthers, and potential 
skeptics such as Dennett. More work also remains to 
be done to establish the exact role in our moral theory 
of what beings care about. However, we have made 
significant progress in both these directions. 
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What Do Cats Care About? 
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In her paper, "What Do Animals Care About?," Lilly-
Marlene Russow argues for two theses. The first is that 
the arguments of Frey and Leahy fail to establish that 
animals do not have interests in a morally relevant sense. 
I think she is successful in defending this thesis. Less 
convincing is her second thesis, namely, that we are 
better off focusing on the question of what animals 
care about than continuing to speak of the interests 
that animals have. While Russow's criticisms of 
behaviorism are persuasive, she offers no compelling 
grounds to accept her suggestion that computers might 
well have desires. Since computers lack nervous 
systems and are not conative organisms, it seems 
implausible to think they have desires. Russow is also 
too casual in assuming that we can simply set a<;ide 
extreme skepticism. She gives no hint of how this can 
be done in a philosophically adequate way. But the main 
question I want to focus on is: What do specific 
nonhuman animals specifically care about? 
Let me begin by reflecting in some detail on 
Russow's claim that "The undeniable fact is that 
experienced observers can tell quite well when an 
animal is happy." I am trained as a professional 
philosopher and not as a professional cat-handler, but I 
do fancy myself an experienced observer of feline 
behavior since I have lived with two cats for about 
thirteen years of my life. I think that for any 
investigation ofwhat animals care about, it is important 
to address specific, concrete examples of what 
DISCUSSION 
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particular animals mayor may not care about. So, now 
I will consider what sorts of things my cats care about. 
I decided to adopt a pair of kittens about four years 
ago, I thought it better to have two cats rather than one 
since I believed that a solitary cat would be less happy 
than a cat with a playmate. I agree with Russow that 
using words like "happy" and "content" to describe 
nonhuman animal behavior is, though scientifically 
unmeasurable, still philosophically justifiable. When I 
went to the Omaha Humane Society to see a litter of 
six-week-old kittens they had told me about over the 
phone, I was shown a litter of four kittens, three females 
and a male. Since I thought I could not easily manage 
four growing cats, I decided to adopt the three females 
while hoping that someone else would adopt the male. 
Thus, my fIrst decision was to separate the orphaned 
siblings. Did the three sisters care about being separated 
from their brother? All four kittens were mewing loudly 
at the time, which I interpreted as distress, but perhaps 
theirdistress was due to their uncomfortable surroundings 
at the Humane Society or the previous loss of their 
mother, and not their separation from their brother. 
Soon after bringing the three kittens home, I tried 
to put small collars with their identification tags on 
them. They reacted by (frantically'!) leaping about, 
arching their necks, and struggling to pull the collars 
off with their paws. I inferred from this behavior that 
they didn't much care for the collars, and so I promptly 
removed them. A week or two later, one of the kittens 
began to have diarIbea My veterinarian diagnosed her 
as suffering from a gastro-intestinal infection, and he 
supplied me with medicine for her. Sadly, the 
medication failed to cure her ailment. Despite my 
efforts, she stopped eating entirely, became very weak 
in a short time, and died on a Sunday evening before I 
could take her to the vet the next morning. Had the 
unfortunate kitten stopped caring about food? Hours 
before she died, her two sisters huddled with her just 
a<; they had often done before when all three were 
healthy. Did the two surviving kittens care about their 
sister dying? I could not judge either way from their 
behavior since they neither attended closely to the dead 
kitten nor avoided it in any obvious way. They simply 
seemed to ignore it. 
As is usually the case, the two cats, Bryseis and 
Chryseis, developed quite distinct personalities. Bryscis, 
the more athletic cat, exhibits a strong interest in 
exploring the basement, going outside, and drinking 
from sinks, the toilet, and the tub. Chryseis, in contrast, 
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seems not to care about the ha'iement, the out-of-doors, 
or drinking from places other than her water bowl; 
Chryseis cares much more about being fed canned rather 
than dry cat food. Do I have a moral obligation to let 
Dryseis go outside? Making them wear collars as kittens 
seemed to make them quite unhappy. So, since Dryseis 
still remains collarless and untagged, I am reluctant to 
let her become an "outdoor" cat. If I allowed her to 
roam free in my neighborhood, I would expose her to 
the risk of fights with other animals, serious injury, or 
evcn death from being struck by an automobilc. Am I 
justified in seriously restricting her liberty as I do? 
Cats are predators, after all, and her telos as a cat 
certainly includes sniffmg outdoor scents, stalking birds, 
chasing insects, and hunting small herbivores. 
Therefore, she might well be more content freely 
exploring the outdoor environment for hours every day 
than staying indoors all but a few minutes every week 
when I closely supervise her limited excursions 
outdoors. Does Bryseis care about living a long, safe 
life indoors? Or would she be much happier roaming 
the neighborhood unimpeded by my paternalistic, 
protectionist interference? Would she return home if I 
let her outside on her own? And if she did not, would 
she be happier as a stray? How am I to interpret her 
behavior so as reasonably to judge what would make 
her happiest? Would there be, to use Russow's words, 
"a high degree of intersubjectivc agreement, at least 
among skilled, trained, experienced practitioners" about 
what would most contribute to Bryseis' happiness? 
Consider another behavior. My cats have developed 
the all too common "vice" of clawing the furniture, 
despite my conscientious efforts to trim their claws 
regularly. If I decided never to allow them outside on 
their own, then they would never need their claws to 
defend themselves from attack by hostile animals. Do 
cats care about being declawed? 
Another element of the telos of cats is surely to 
reproduce. Do female cats care about being spayed? 
Are feline mothers who nurture kiuens happier than 
their spayed sisters? Do male cats care about being 
neutered? Are promiscuous tomcats happier than their 
neutered, more docile brothers'? Or do we have a 
paternalistic justification for spaying and neutering dogs 
and cats in order to minimize the number, and the usual 
suffering, of strays? 
Russow suggests that "a definitive criterion of what 
we care about (as opposed to what we think we care 
about) is that it contributes to our happiness Of alleviates 
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our unhappiness." Given the behavior my cats exhibit 
when I am away from home for long periods of time, 
surely they would be happier, and not just think 
themselves happier, were I to spend more time at home 
with them. Does this suffice to establish that I have a 
pri11Ul facie duty to spend more time at home with my 
cats'? Russow proposes the following definition: "5 
cares about 0 if and only if S directly desires 0, and 
getting or achieving 0 contributes to 5's happiness." 
This definition secms inadequate for two reasons. 
First, while it may seem to capture our ordinary concept 
of caring about inanimate objects, I think it fails to 
describe our ordinary concept of caring about other 
sentient subjects. Many humans, and perhaps many 
intelligent nonhuman animals as well, care about other 
sentient beings for their own sakes, and not only because 
the company of those subjects contributes to the 
happiness of the individual who is doing the caring. I 
offer the following definition of intersubjective caring: 
S1 cares about 52 if and only if S1 desires to 
promote the happiness or well-being of S2' 
whether SI and 52 are conspecifics or sentient 
beings of different species. 
Let us return to my stock example. Do my cats care 
about each other (and me) in the same sort of way that 
they care about being fed canned cat food and having a 
clean litterbox? If so, then when they play with each 
other they care about each other the same sort of way 
they care about a paper clip or a pair of socks when 
they play with these things. I am not inclined to construe 
their caring about each other so narrowly. They exhibit 
reciprocal altruism when they groom each other. Such 
reciprocal altruism suggests to me that they may well 
care about each other's well-being to some extent. That 
is, Bryseis may well care about the subject Chryseis, 
an individual with her own well-being, rather than 
merely caring about the object Chryseis, a thing that 
contributes to Bryseis' happiness. 
The second reason to hesitate accepting Russow's 
definition of "caring about" is that she is imposing it as 
a stipulative definition that does not, in fact, "accord 
well with our ordinary concept of caring about" even 
when "0" refers exclusively to objects. For example, I 
could on some occasion care about having some 
cheesecake. Later, after I find and eat a piece of 
cheesecake, I could well discover that having it did not 
make me happy but, rather, made me sad for failing to 
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keep to my diet. It would be wrong to say in retrospect 
that I didn't really care about having the cheesecake in 
the first place. Rather, we should say I no longer care 
about having more cheesecake because, having 
committed dietary sin, I now care more about returning 
to my diet. In short, I do not see how Russow's 
distinction between "caring about" and "thinking we 
care about" does more work than the distinction between 
"taking an interest in" and "successfully promoting 
one's self-interest." To say that smokers take an interest 
in smoking, but smoking is not really in their self-
interest, strikes me as more in accord with our ordinary 
concepts than saying that smokers think they care about 
smoking, but do not really care, since smoking does 
not contribute to their long-term happiness. Similarly, 
to say that my cat Bryseis takes an interest in roaming 
free outside, but roaming free outside is not really in 
her self-interest, makes more sense to me than to say 
that Bryseis thinks she cares about roaming free outside, 
but she does not really care, since it probably endangers 
her long-term happiness. 
Russow has made a decent attempt to advance the 
discussion of how best to talk about animals' interests, 
desires, and happiness. However, her proposed 
defmition of "caring about" fails to mark the qualitative 
difference between caring about an object and caring 
about a subject and docs not, in fact, accord well with 
our ordinary concept of caring about generally. 
Moreover, since Russow's discussion is deficient at the 
theoretical level on these points, its application to 
questions about specific animals-for example, whether 
housecats care about being allowed to stray outside, 




I could respond by answering Professor Stephens' 
specific questions about his cats: either offering a 
judgment about what they do and don't care about, or 
explaining what one would do to determine that But 
that would fill up all the remaining time, and miss his 
deeper concerns. Instead, I'll say just a few words about 
two more general concerns that he raises, either 
explicitly or implicitly: 
(1) how we can determine the object of intentional 
states, including caring, and 
(2) why "caring about" is an improvement over talk 
about interests. 
I take it that the philosophical issue underlying 
Stephens' questions about what his cats care about in 
specific incidents is the concern that there may be no 
legitimate way of answering these questions. The full 
answer to his concern would be too complicated to lay 
out in detail-not because he's asking about cat." but 
because specifying the object of any mental state is a 
complicated business. Nonetheless, I'll try to indicate 
some of the factors that should be involved. 
First, sometimes de re specifications ofmental states 
are the most appropriate ones. That is to say, we can 
say that Chryseis believes ofStephens that he is a source 
of food, without claiming or being committed to 
anything about how he is "represented." The same is 
true of other propositional attitudes, especially caring 
about. 'Ibus, it is certainly reasonable, and perhaps even 
necessary, at times to read "Chryseis cares about 
Stephens" as a de re attitude. 
Even if there is good reason to demand a de diclO 
account of a mental state, there still may be good 
DISCUSSION 
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reason to suspect that we may not be able to specify 
the content of the state in English. First, the concepts 
of an individual who does not use or know English 
may well be different in important ways from those 
easily expressible in English. Indeed, given the 
anti-Fregean moves in contemporary philosophy of 
language, the so-called "narrow content" of a state may 
not be properly expressible in any public language. 
Second, when we are concerned specifically with 
caring about, rather than just any mental state, we are 
apt to conflate questions about how to specify the 
object of the state with the more practical issue: what 
would count as an adequate substitute for what is cared 
about, what would make the subject happy in the same 
sort of way. Thus, when we ask whether a cat really 
cares about her dead companion, we may really be 
trying to figure out whether introducing a new kitten 
would "make things right again." 
As I said, these remarks only touch the surface of 
questions about fixing and describing the objects of 
care, but I hope they are in keeping with my original 
suggestion: current developments in philosophy of 
mind can help us develop a more sophisticated and 
more accurate way of thinking about the objects of 
mental states. 
The second issue I want to address is the proper 
understanding of "care." I have proposed to analyze 
"caring about" in terms of two factors: desire and 
happiness. Thus, we can say about cats who want go 
outside: they might desire to roam, but would be happier 
staying inside, even though they don't realize that. The 
question of how we should interpret a eat's behavior in 
order "to judge what would make her happiest" is 
misleading: the cat's current behavior is often not the 
sole or even most important data about what will make 
her happy. Since the second condition in our definition 
of "caring about" refers to the future, it is possible for x 
to be such that it will make one happy, and thus it is 
possible for someone to care about x, but not know that 
x will make her happy, and hence not know that she 
cares about x. This state of affairs is even more likely 
to occur with nonhuman animals than with normal, 
adult, language using humans. It is also relevant to 
cases such as SiCphens' cheesecake example: if eating 
the cheesecake did not, in fact, contribute to his 
happiness (Le., he eats the cheesecake and is no 
happier afterwards-perhaps even feels disappointed), 
I would argue that, even though he wanted or desired 
the cheesecake, he was simply mistaken in thinking 
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that he cared about it. If we tell the story slightly 
differently (eating one small slice of cake made him 
happy, given that he was able to return to his diet), then 
we should conclude that he cares about eating 
cheesecake in moderation. 
Proper attention to the details ofmy proposal is also 
relevant to Stephens' suggestion that my proposed 
analysis of caring fails to do justice to caring for other 
subjects. I explicit denied the claim that we care about 
things because they contribute to our happiness. If we 
avoid that mistake, I fail to see how caring for other 
subjects falls outside my account. 
I can only briefly mention two other points 
Stephens brings up. First, docs the fact that Scares 
about x engender a prima facie duty to ensure that S 
obtains x? The short anSwer is that my account was not 
intended to give a complete answer, although I will point 
out that we do hold people morally culpable for 
neglecting animals for whom they are responsible. 
Second, he objects to my claim that computers might 
have desires on the grounds that they don't have nervous 
systems. This seems to me to beg the question against 
artificial intelligence in particular, and functionalist 
accounts of mind in general. 
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